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About the Working Paper Series 
This article is one in a series of papers addressing one or more issues of critical 
importance to the acquisition profession.  A working paper is a forum to accomplish a 
variety of objectives, such as: (1) present a rough draft of a particular piece of 
acquisition research, (2) structure a “white paper” to present opinion or reasoning, (3) 
put down one’s thoughts in a “think piece” for collegial review, (4) present a preliminary 
draft of an eventual article in an acquisition periodical, (5) provide a tutorial (such as a 
technical note) to accompany a case study, and (6) develop a dialogue among 
practitioners and researchers that encourages debate and discussion on topics of 
mutual importance.   A working paper is generally the “internal” outlet for academic and 
research institutions to cultivate an idea, argument or hypothesis, particularly when in its 
infant stages.  The primary intent is to induce critical thinking about crucial acquisition 
issues/problems that will become part of the acquisition professional body of 
knowledge.  
It is expected that articles in the working paper series will eventually be published 
in other venues, such as in refereed journals and other periodicals, as technical reports, 
as chapters in a book, as cases or case studies, as monographs, or as a variety of other 
similar publications. 
Readers are encouraged to provide both written and oral feedback to working- 
paper authors.  Through rigorous discussion and discourse, it is anticipated that 
underlying assumptions, concepts, conventional wisdom, theories and principles will be 
challenged, examined and articulated.
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Introduction 
The United States Federal Government spends greater than $150 billion every 
year on services, making it one of the world’s largest purchasers.  Because of the large 
monetary value and the vast number of public- and private-sector jobs involved, the 
decision of who is the best provider of these services is an important and often highly-
charged issue.  This article intends to improve understanding of the significance of the 
recent changes made to the A-76 process, and to offer insight into industry’s 
perspective—gained through a recently-conducted interview—on the revised process.  
Although empirical results of these recent changes are months, if not years away, 
several improvement recommendations will be offered towards fully achieving efficient 
and effective competition between public and private sources. 
Much has been written on the processes contained in the Office of Management 
and Budget’s Circular A-76 entitled, “Performance of Commercial Activities.”  Indeed, a 
recent database search at the Naval Postgraduate School library in Monterey, California 
revealed 19 Master’s theses pertaining directly to the subject matter, and another bevy 
of information documented by various government officials and heads of agencies 
concerning recent changes to the process.  Current events, too, have kept discussions 
surrounding commercial outsourcing in the forefront of many researchers’ minds.  As 
recently as February 2004, for example, debate swirled around the issue of whether or 
not private-sector companies under contract with the United States Government should 
be permitted to sub-contract with foreign countries.  With these recent developments in 
mind, and in spite of the preexistence of voluminous content, there is still a prevalent 
need to “get the word out” regarding recent changes made to the Circular.   
To gain full appreciation of the magnitude of these changes, it is important to 
completely understand the stimulus behind them.  In the spring of 2001, President 
George W. Bush and his Administration focused their efforts on bold strategies for 
improving the management and performance of the federal government.  What they 
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was an initiative on competitive sourcing.  This initiative set the stage for others in 
government to rally behind their President, and institute changes of their own.  
Transformation within the Department of Defense, for instance, was set in motion by 
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld for, among other things, the purpose of 
introducing more efficient business-management practices. 
Other changes stemming from the President’s Management Agenda included 
reform of the decades-old Circular pertaining to the performance of commercial 
activities.  Later that same year (2001), a Commercial Activities Panel chaired by the 
Comptroller General of the United States was commissioned to study concerns about 
the timeliness and fairness of the process for public/private competitions.  The Panel 
was also charged with devising effective workforce practices to help ensure the 
successful implementation of competitive sourcing in the federal government.  Following 
the recommendations of the Panel, sweeping changes were made to the A-76 process 
as the government sought to become more market-driven.   
Determining whether to obtain services in-house or through commercial contracts 
is an important economic and strategic decision for agencies.  According to Office of 
Management and Budget July 2003 estimates, 26 percent of the workforce from 
agencies being tracked under the President’s Management Agenda are engaged in 
commercial activities that should be available for competition.  In light of the fact that the 
Department of Defense has achieved greater than 30 percent savings on the roughly 
3,000 competitions it has conducted since 1979, there appears to be plenty of room left 
for harvesting savings [Ref. 1].  Not surprisingly, use of Circular A-76 is expected to 
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Literature 
Office of Management and Budget’s Circular A-76 establishes federal policy for 
the competition of commercial activities.  It embodies the longstanding policy of the 
federal government to rely on the private sector for needed commercial services in 
order to ensure the American people receive the maximum value for their tax dollars.  
Maximum value is attained through the introduction of competition; when forced to 
compete, government and commercial service providers streamline their operations and 
improve efficiency.  It is this improved efficiency that has yielded significant savings and 
increased preparedness To gain a comprehensive understanding of the recent changes 
made to A-76, the “old” process (pre-May 2003) will be compared and contrasted to the 
“new” process (post-May 2003).  
The origins of the A-76 process date back to the mid-1950s, to the Eisenhower 
Administration.  During this time, the former Bureau of Budget introduced Bulletin 55-4. 
This bulletin stated, in part, that the “general policy of the federal government will be to 
not carry on any commercial activity to provide a service or product for its own use if 
such product or service can be procured from private enterprise through ordinary 
business channels” [Ref. 2].  In 1966, this policy was later codified in the adaptation of 
the Office of Management and Budget’s Circular A-76.  In this context, a “circular” refers 
to instruction or information issued by the Office of Management and Budget to the 
various federal agencies.  Generally, these instructions and/or informational publications 
are expected to be of a lasting nature, typically two or more years.  Circular A-76 was 
the 76th such issuance.   
Since its original issuance in 1966, the Circular has been revised four times—in 
1967, 1979, 1983 and, just recently, in May 2003.  In 1979, the Office of Management 
and Budget issued a supplemental handbook to accompany the Circular, and 
subsequently revised the addition three times.  In May, the handbook was rescinded, 
and its contents were revised and incorporated in attachments to the Circular as part of 
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Because the classification of an activity as commercial or inherently- 
governmental is a critical first step towards, or away from, outsourcing proceedings, it is 
important to draw the distinction between commercial activities and inherently- 
governmental functions.  Commercial activities involve functions that are primarily 
ministerial and internal in nature, such as building security, mail operations, operation of 
cafeterias, housekeeping, facilities operations and maintenance, warehouse operations, 
motor vehicle fleet management operations, or other routine electrical or mechanical 
services.  Inherently-governmental functions, on the other hand, are functions so 
intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance by government 
personnel.  According to the Circular, inherently-governmental functions normally fall 
into two categories:  the exercise of sovereign government authority or the 
establishment of procedures and processes related to the oversight of monetary 
transactions or entitlements [Ref. 3].  Our military forces, and the national security they 
provide, represent the best example of an inherently-governmental function. 
In its early stages, and up until recently (May 2003), the Circular A-76 cost 
comparison process comprised a four-step process.  In the first step, the government 
developed a performance/work statement that outlined the scope of work for the activity 
at issue, and then developed its estimate for in-house performance based on the 
requirements outlined in the performance/work statement.  In the second step, industry-
wide competition determined whose proposal would be selected for comparison to the 
government’s in-house cost estimate.  This step used “best value” evaluation criteria, 
such as the sophistication and quality of the technology employed.  In the third step, the 
winning company from industry was compared to the government’s in-house estimate to 
ensure both were based on the same scope of work and performance levels.  In this 
step, the government’s contracting officer was permitted to make adjustments to the 
government’s proposal in order to make it more comparable to the private-sector 
proposal.  The final step was a cost comparison between the industry’s and the 
government’s in-house estimate.  Victory went to the entity with the least expensive, 
technically-acceptable proposal.  As we will later see, this process gave rise to a 
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The new A-76 process became effective in May 2003.  The revised Circular’s 
standard competition process does away with the two-step process in which industry 
first conducts a “best value competition” among other industry hopefuls, and then 
conducts a cost comparison competition with the government.  This change was in 
direct response to criticism of the old rules whereby an “apples to apples” comparison 
could not be achieved since industry’s “best value approach” did not necessarily 
translate to the lowest cost alternative.  Now, an agency may select one of four 
standard competition alternatives.  In each competition, all offers, including the 
government’s “agency tender,” will be evaluated together.  The four standard 
competition alternatives include a sealed bid acquisition conducted in accordance with 
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 14, and three types of negotiated 
procurements conducted in accordance with FAR Part 15. 
Now there will be a single competition, with the government employee 
organization generally being treated as if it were another commercial bidder.  Moreover, 
the competition will be conducted using the framework of the FAR.  According to the 
Commercial Activities Panel (the group chiefly responsible for many of the recent 
changes incorporated), the “new Circular permits a greater reliance on procedures 
contained in the Federal Acquisition Regulations, and should result in a more 
transparent, simpler and consistently applied process” [Ref. 4].  These revisions will 
also save time. 
In fact, the Circular now requires agencies to conduct standard competitions 
within 12 months after announcement of the competition (announcement of the 
competition comprises formal public announcement at the local level and posting to the 
FedBizOpps.gov website).  The Circular defines a competition as “standard” if a 
commercial activity is performed by more than 65 full-time equivalents (one full-time 
equivalent is equal to 1,776 productive hours per year), or if a private sector or public 
reimbursable source (Navy Working Capital Fund) and the agency tender will include an 
aggregate of more than 65 full-time equivalents.  Certain competitions qualify as 
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“streamlined” competition procedures may be used if a commercial activity is performed 
by an aggregate of 65 or fewer full-time equivalents and/or any number of military 
personnel, or if a private or public reimbursable source and the agency will include an 
aggregate of 65 or fewer full-time equivalents.  In general, “streamlined” competitions 
are reserved for more informal actions [Ref. 5]. 
Adding to the improved timeliness was a reduction in the sheer volume of the 
Circular.  Whereas pre-May 2003 “Performance of Commercial Activities” guidance was 
contained in four separate documents, including an 18-page definition of “inherently- 
governmental function,” the post-May 2003 is contained in only one document.  The 
revision further refines the manner in which government officials (termed Competitive 
Sourcing Officials) declare activities commercial or inherently-governmental.  
Competitive Sourcing Officials, normally at the assistant-secretary level or equivalency 
within an agency, must choose one of six “reason codes” to explain why Government 
personnel are presently performing a commercial activity.  As will be shown later, part of 
this consolidation and simplification was in response to strict guidelines that governed 
the team that conceived these changes. The members of that team deemed it 
necessary to inject fairness into the process. 
Other changes incorporated into the new Circular address issues pertaining to 
conflicts of interest.  Whereas under the old rules there were only a few prohibitions in 
place, the new rules are replete with guidance governing conflicts of interest.  For 
example, in Attachment B, starting at subsection D(2), conflicts of interest inherent in 
the functions of various teams are addressed.  The revised Circular now provides that 
members of the government team that develop the performance work statement may 
not also be members of the government team that develop the “most efficient 
organization,” removing any possibility of requirements tailoring.  Moreover, an Agency 
Tender Official has been appointed under the new rules to independently champion the 
agency tender.  The individual assigned as the Agency Tender Official cannot be the 
contracting officer, and must also be disassociated from the Source Selection 
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performance work statement.  Additionally, the revised rules contain provisions barring 
directly-affected government personnel, defined as personnel whose work is being 
competed, or any person who has previous knowledge of the agency tender from 
participating “in any manner” on the Source Selection Evaluation Board [Ref. 6].  As 
was the case in the old rules, the Source Selection Authority ultimately decides the 
winner of the competition. 
Finally, the new Circular, at Attachment B, Section E, contains provisions for 
improved post-competition accountability.  Among the new requirements is a database 
that tracks the execution of “streamlined” and “standard” competitions.  Each agency 
must populate and keep up-to-date information on each competitive action, recording 
events as they occur (real-time) from the date of public announcement through either 
completion of the last performance period or cancellation of the competition.  These 
rules formalize a process only the most conscientious agencies had been using up to 
this point.  What’s more, software management tools and other techniques (such as 
Gantt charts) can now be better utilized to manage timelines, so each agency can be 
held accountable for competitions that take longer than they should to complete.   
Research Method 
To capture data relating to how industry views the latest changes to the A-76 
process, the researcher interviewed a businessman from an industry familiar with the 
government’s outsourcing policies.  The research method used was the semi-structured 
interview, whereby a series of both pre-determined and spontaneous questions were 
asked.  The 40-minute interview was conducted via telephone, and a recording device 
was used.  The interview transcript was scrubbed to remove actual names, and then 
studied using qualitative analysis techniques.  What emerged were three themes 
revealing the interviewee’s opinion and attitude towards the revised A-76 process.  The 
researcher acknowledges the limitations of this type of study, namely restricting the 
sample size to only one, but nonetheless offers the following analysis as one “data 
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The individual selected for study is a Vice President for Business Development at 
a major corporation.  According to their website, the company recorded over $20 billion 
in sales last year, and employs over 100,000 people worldwide.  It ranked among the 
top 100 largest corporations (in terms of revenue) on Fortune Magazine’s listing of the 
500 largest corporations [Ref. 7].  
The company consists of two business groups, one of which supplies systems to 
control heating, ventilating, air conditioning, lighting, security and fire management for 
buildings.  This group also provides integrated facility management, and performs 
facility management and consulting services for many Fortune 500 companies.  
According to the company’s website, they are responsible for the management of more 
than one billion square feet worldwide. 
The interviewee works within this group, and is responsible for developing new 
business for the company.  His particular focus is on federal government clients, 
especially within the Navy and Marine Corps.  He has been with this company for five 
years, and has been conducting this type of work for nearly two decades.  He regularly 
interacts with government contracting officials, industry leaders, military officials and 
other stakeholders.  
Findings 
Careful analysis of the interview recording and transcript revealed three 
pervasive themes.  For purposes of this research, the researcher considered 
“pervasive” to mean a substantive idea occurring more than once during the interview, 
or ideas that appeared to naturally cluster together.  Interestingly, themes did not 
appear evident during the interview, but only became apparent during subsequent 
analysis.  To assist in differentiating separate themes, a different color highlighter was 
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Despite significant recent revisions, problems still exist within 
the A-76 process. 
The interviewee witnessed several unfortunate circumstances leading him to 
conclude that the A-76 process is still fundamentally problematic.  He relayed the 
following perfect example of how not to entertain a commercial activities study.  In the 
Fall of 2003, he recalled, he was on a site visit in New Jersey with several other 
representatives of industry.  They were on a fact-finding mission, and were particularly 
interested in learning more about the commercial activity they would be performing 
should they win the job.  As the tour progressed, it became apparent that the tour guide 
was less than forthcoming with needed information.  In one instance, he disallowed a 
tour of a portion of the facilities, hastily citing some obscure regulation that prevented 
their entrance.  Instead of pre-arranging the appropriate access authority, as would 
have been expected, the tour guide chose instead to stonewall the industry 
representatives.  In the end, it was revealed that his obfuscation was for good cause:  
the tour guide was one of the people whose job was at stake in this particular 
commercial activities study! 
Unfortunately, this case starkly illustrates the conflict of interest still inherent in 
the process.  Add to this dilemma the increased pressure brought to bear by labor 
unions such as the American Federation of Government Employees, civil service 
representatives and local politicians, and you have as a result a highly-charged and 
impetuous environment in which to conduct business. 
A second problem identified within the A-76 process is that of an apparent lack of 
accountability.  The interviewee described it this way: 
If I put myself in the place of a contracting official, and I realize that I’m getting 
enormous pressure on one side from labor unions and sometimes even from 
Congress to not allow anybody to take jobs away from the people who have 
them…but am not getting any support on the other side, nor any support to 
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going to take the path of least resistance.  I’m not likely to push back too hard to 
ensure there is a fair competition. 
What the interviewee aptly describes is his perception of a lack of accountability within 
the process. 
A third problem, though less significant, represents more of the same incongruity 
between what is perceived to be happening, and what is actually happening in the 
context of the A-76 process.  What the interviewee refers to as an “unintended 
consequence on industry” occurs when the government inattentively provides data to 
industry in a format that cannot be sorted or organized, such as a portable document file 
(commonly referred to as a pdf file), or data that has been “locked.”  As a result, 
thousands of pages of data must be pored through manually, then sorted and organized 
so it is useful to industry in their proposal preparation.  The result of this 
inattentiveness—combined with the protracted timeline of the process—has increased 
proposal costs; these, according to the interviewee, are ultimately passed on to the 
government in the form of increased general and administrative overhead rates.   
Best value is not always being achieved. 
“One of my greatest concerns is that I don’t believe the Navy is getting best 
value, and it is important to our country that we spend our tax dollars wisely on national 
defense.”  
Enterprise-wide, the interviewee is concerned that “billions of dollars” are being 
wasted on inefficient operations being wrongfully retained by the government, instead of 
being subjected to the cost-saving forces of competition. 
The interviewee went on to describe the lack of confidence in the process felt by 
him and others in industry.  He conceded this lack of confidence “lends itself very 
heavily to a ‘no go’ decision,” referring to the predetermination he personally makes as 
to whether a proposal will be worth the time and expense involved.  Similar to the fellow 
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the appearance of being less than forthcoming with information results in a company not 
bidding on a particular project.  If the problem is pervasive enough, all of industry will 
choose not to bid on the job (as was the case in this situation).  And if all of industry 
chooses not to submit a proposal for a particular job because of perceived impenetrable 
bureaucracy, then competition for commercial activities is not taking place to the fullest 
extent possible.  Therefore, we have a situation where the Navy is not getting the best 
value.   
As the interview continued, the researcher was asked, “You know what ‘best 
value procurement’ is, as defined by the Navy, right?”  “Yes,” was the response.  “Well, 
you are not getting that either.”  Under the new rules, best value competitions may be 
conducted among all competitors (including the government) when it is in the best 
interest of the government to consider award other than to the lowest-cost/priced 
source.  Unfortunately, the interviewee had witnessed competitions that were being 
promoted as best value procurements, when, in fact, they were not.  “Too often we find 
that the real means of selection is not best value, but technically-acceptable low cost.”  
The interviewee added, “Best value has a very subjective definition.  We find there is 
much less attention paid to efficiencies, and ultimately the decisions are made solely on 
the basis of low cost, even when they say it is a best-value procurement.”  He 
concluded, “So, even when they advertise it as a so-called ‘best value procurement,’ 
industry knows full well that what they [the government] are really looking for is 
technically-acceptable low cost.”    
Despite shortcomings, the Navy is genuinely concerned about 
improving the process. 
“One of the reasons I like doing business with the Navy is because I’m convinced 
that at almost every level, there really is an honest desire to do a good job…I get awful 
mad at some people in some circumstances, but for the most part, I am convinced that 
these folks are doing the best job they can.”    
A third theme revealed through analysis of the transcript was an assurance of the 
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for this article, the interviewee had attended a conference whose agenda included a 
discussion to address some of the problematic issues surrounding the A-76 process.  
According to him, many stakeholders were present, including the head of the 
contracting competency at one of the Navy’s hardware systems commands.  At several 
points throughout the interview, the interviewee made reference to several ongoing 
improvements, such as the formation of what he termed “The Navy Board of Directors” 
(formally known as the Department of the Navy Strategic Sourcing Acquisition Centers 
of Excellence Board of Directors, established in September 2003).   
His satisfaction was clearly evident as he described the role of this newly- 
founded organization.  “The Board will act as high cover for the contracting officers 
trying to run a ‘level playing field’. […] So, when you get push-back from the unions, 
Congressmen, or whomever is trying to move this off a ‘level playing field,’ there will be 
a Board of Directors within the Navy that will have enough clout to keep things fair.”  
Thus, despite his earlier criticisms of the lack of accountability in the process, it appears 
as though he feels the Navy is, in fact, taking remedial action. 
The researcher next asked the interviewee to characterize the recent changes to 
the A-76 process.  His response indicated he was generally pleased with the direction in 
which the Navy was headed.  “There is much greater potential for fairness,” he 
concluded.  Not completely absent from his remarks, however, was a small degree of 
skepticism.  “Things can always be bent in such a way that the ‘playing field’ is not 
even…but the chances of an ‘even playing field’ under the new rules are much greater.”  
He went on to say he would encourage the Navy to “embrace the new rules” in order to 
move ahead.   
As the final question, the interviewee was asked whether or not his company had 
ever filed an appeal to a competitive outsourcing decision.  “Yes,” he replied. “We are 
not shy about appealing.”  He continued, “Sometimes we will appeal even though we 
know we will not win the job, but just to try and clean up the program.”  His response 
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Discussion 
In the paragraphs that follow, each theme developed will be related to the 
literature previously discussed.  In particular, the extent to which the revised A-76 
process addresses the interviewee’s concerns will be examined.  Finally, several 
process improvements will be recommended.   
The first theme chronicles several areas the informant feels are still beleaguering 
the A-76 process.  Most notable among them is a lack of confidence in the fairness of 
the process.  Interestingly, the Commercial Activities Panel which convened three years 
earlier targeted this very issue.  In fact, a set of guiding principles was commissioned to 
temper any and/or all change recommendations.  These “Guiding Principles for 
Sourcing Policy” comprised ten objectives, four of which made reference either directly 
or indirectly to the importance of the evenhandedness of the process.  No other 






























Evidently, the Panel understood the widespread misgivings surrounding the 
process, and intended to take overt action to correct the problem.  Not surprisingly, 
many of the changes contained within the revised Circular deal directly with the 
“fairness” issue.  For example, elimination of the four-step competitive process removed 
one major source of consternation.  Under the new rules, the government will compete 
directly against industry, and will not compete unfairly against industry’s “best value” 
alternative.  As discussed previously, the old document mandated a competition among 
industry hopefuls using “best value procurement” rules.  Consistent with the best value 
approach, the lowest-cost alternative was not always selected to compete against the 
Guiding Principles for Sourcing Policy 
Federal sourcing policies should: 
1.  Support agency missions, goals, and objectives. 
2.  Be consistent with human capital practices designed to attract, motivate, retain, and reward a 
high-performing federal workforce. 
3.  Recognize that inherently-governmental and certain other functions should be performed by 
federal workers. 
4.  Create incentives and processes to foster high performing, efficient, and effective organizations 
throughout the federal government. 
5.  Be based on a clear, transparent, and consistently-applied process. 
6.  Avoid arbitrary full-time equivalent or other arbitrary numerical goals. 
7.  Establish a process that, for activities that may be performed by either the public or the private 
sector, would permit public and private sources to participate in competitions for work currently 
performed in-house, work currently contracted to the private sector, and new work, consistent with 
these guiding principles. 
8.  Ensure that, when competitions are held, they are conducted as fairly, effectively, and efficiently 
as possible. 
9.  Ensure that competitions involve a process that considers both quality and cost factors. 
10. Provide for accountability in connection with all sourcing decisions. 
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government’s “most efficient organization,” and consequently was subjected to an 
unequal comparison.  This no longer is the case. 
The imposition of the time limits—90 days (simplified) and 12 months 
(standard)—and the simplification of the governing instruction are further significant 
improvements in the process.  While such moves are a step in the right direction 
towards relieving the “impenetrable bureaucracy” surrounding the process, applying 
such audacious simplifications to some of the more complex outsourcing issues will be 
a challenge.  While commendable, the researcher considers the shortened timeframes 
to be unrealistic.  
Some government officials agree.  According to the testimony of David M. 
Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, given before the Senate 
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management in July 2003, the Department 
of Defense will have “difficulties in meeting the time frames set out in the new Circular 
for completing the standard competition process.”  He points out that recent data within 
the Department of Defense “indicate that competitions have taken, on average, 25 
months” (under the old document), and that “much work remains to be done” [Ref. 9]. 
Despite such reservations, however, one thing is for sure:  preliminary planning 
will take on increased importance under the new Circular.  The new rules state that prior 
to public announcement (start date) of a streamlined or standard competition, the 
agency must complete several preparative steps.  These include evaluating the scope 
of activity and the number of full time equivalents involved, grouping business activities, 
assessing the availability of workload data, determining incumbent baseline costs, 
establishing schedules, and appointing the various competition officials.  Whether or not 
competitions adhere to the stricter timelines will largely rest upon how well this up-front 
planning was performed in each case. 
Other changes incorporated into the revised Circular address the problem of 
conflict of interest (as addressed in the literature section).  However, this problem has 
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(less than six months after adaptation of the revised rules).   The government 
employee’s refusal (referred to in the previous narrative) to disclose pertinent details to 
a team of industry personnel seeking information on the soon-to-be competed 
commercial activity smacks terribly of a potential conflict of interest.  It appears as 
though one misguided employee was able to stymie the entire process.  By doing so, he 
failed (succeeded?) to let the process work the way it was intended.  Admittedly, this 
individual might have been unaware of the recently-revised rules which place greater 
emphasis on precluding conflicts of interest.  But, for the woebegone group of industry 
representatives, perception was reality.    
Related is the second theme of not achieving best value.  This is particularly 
disturbing since it flies in the face of the intent of A-76.  If the ultimate purpose of A-76 is 
to leverage the effects of competition in performing commercial activities, the 
government is coming up short.  The Department of Defense recently reported that in 
15% of the competitions, “no satisfactory source” was found in the private sector.  
Comments obtained from a board member of one of industry’s contract associations 
tend to agree.  According to him, when his company bids on an A-76 competition, there 
are always less private-sector competitors (sometimes none) in comparison to non-A-76 
competitions; for the same type of work as in the former, there may be many other 
private-sector competitors in the latter.  
The fact that industry has expressed a lack of confidence in the outsourcing 
process is understandable.  For years there has been concern regarding whether or not 
the government was “playing fair” with respect to outsourcing its commercial activities.  
Clearly, however, this fundamental component of conducting outsourcing has been 
sufficiently addressed.  Now, just about everywhere, one finds reference to the fact that 
President Bush’s Competitive Sourcing Initiative has “leveled the playing field” between 
the government and industry in relation to commercial activity outsourcing.  The Office 
of Management and Budget’s press release announcing the revised A-76 read, “This 
revision marks the first major overhaul of the process, and works to level the playing 
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Interestingly, this research revealed a role reversal of sorts.  In the mid-1980s, a 
nationwide poll reported a large distrust and “lack of confidence”—not with the federal 
government, but with industry.  It seems industry had developed a reputation for 
overpricing and underperforming on contracts, and it deteriorated to the point that  
President Reagan ultimately initiated a study to expose and correct these deficiencies 
(known as The President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, or, as 
it’s more commonly referred to, the Packard Commission).  Currently, one could argue 
industry has a similar lack of confidence in the manner in which government conducts 
competitive sourcing. 
The third theme is perhaps the most important.  By all accounts, the government 
is taking the necessary steps to ensure its competitive sourcing policies are consistently 
applied across the board, that a “level playing field” exists.  The Navy, for example, has 
established two Strategic Sourcing Acquisition Centers of Excellence in order to provide 
standardization and process control to the A-76 competition process.  Overseeing these 
centers is a Board of Directors, comprised of high-ranking government officials such as 
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Acquisition Management, the Chief of 
Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.  Their responsibilities are 
to ensure that the Centers of Excellence perform as honest brokers of the acquisition 
process, to provide a consistent approach to strategic sourcing policy, and to warrant 
independence from external influences [Ref. 11].  
Other means to achieve a “level playing field” have been implemented as well.  
The revised Circular treats the government’s “agency tender” in a manner consistent 
with treatment afforded to offers submitted by the private sector.  To be sure, agency 
tenders may now be excluded from a standard competition where they are materially 
deficient and where such deficiencies are not, or cannot be, timely corrected.   
Excluding a technically-unacceptable in-house proposal from an A-76 
competition represents a major departure from previous rules, whereby agencies were 
required to adjust otherwise unacceptable in-house proposals to include adequate 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = - 18- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
researcher concludes this ability to “take many bites at the apple” was a particular 
source of frustration for the interviewee. 
Conclusions 
The federal government has indeed taken on a formidable challenge in 
attempting to make government more market-driven.  Along the way, it has incorporated 
technology, streamlined regulations, increased accountability and elevated the 
importance of FAR-like principles in the competition for commercial activities.  
Furthermore, it has addressed some of its longstanding problems, such as perceived 
conflicts of interest and what some felt was a need for a “level playing field.”  Clearly, 
the government has accomplished much improvement in the latest revision of Circular 
A-76. 
But, as this research demonstrates, the full effects of the recent changes have 
not successfully penetrated the entire organization, nor have the changes fully 
addressed each of the interviewee’s concerns.  The interviewee still reports cases of 
conflict of interest preventing competition within some organizations. Though his 
comments represent just one of the many perspectives of industry, the fact that some 
organizations are able to circumvent the process and shortchange the American 
taxpayer is nonetheless troubling.  Moreover, there still exist several unintended 
consequences of the shortcomings of the system on industry—such as the government 
providing data in a format that cannot be sorted or organized—which tend to increase 
costs.  An effort to curb such superfluous costs should be initiated.   
Most importantly, there still exists a highly-charged and impetuous environment 
surrounding certain competitions which, if left unchecked, has the potential for 
preventing the process from working as it was intended.  Obtained comments revealing 
industry’s trepidation in bidding on A-76 work are an indicator of a more widespread 
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This environment is to be expected, though.  After all, jobs are at stake.  The 
government, and in particular the Navy, has taken steps outside of Circular A-76 to 
attempt to assuage this contentious environment.  One such attempt is the recent 
establishment of a Board of Directors, comprised of senior Navy leadership, whose 
function is to act as high cover within the process to ensure that the relentless 
pressures of Congress and the labor unions representing potentially-displaced workers 
are met head on. 
Two additional measures are recommended to ensure efficient and effective use 
of competition.  First, an ombudsman position should be established to stand in the gap 
between industry and government.  This person could cultivate better governmental 
understanding of the factors making A-76 competitions undesirable for industry.  
Conversely, an ombudsman could enlighten industry as to why certain sourcing 
decisions, while valid, appear disparate.  Practically speaking, an ombudsman could 
represent another avenue of alternate dispute resolution.  In the earlier situation, where 
an uncooperative worker prevented all of industry from bidding on a job, an ombudsman 
could have potentially intervened and evoked a different outcome.   
Secondly, the Navy is encouraged to completely embrace the recent changes 
made to the A-76 process.  As this research reveals, there is still room for improvement.  
Consider how the interviewee described some so-called “best value procurements” as 
merely a subterfuge for “technically-acceptable, low cost” competitions.  The rules state 
clearly how such competitions are to be conducted; yet, it is nonetheless disturbing to 
know that industry feels as though it is getting the wool pulled over its eyes.   
For those federal employees that are unaccustomed to the uncertainty of 
competition, a change of mindset will certainly be necessary.  As history demonstrates, 
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